The age-old "brain in a vat" scenarios are often useful fodder to frame other philosophical issues within, such as realism v. anti-realism, but not much else. However, Nick Bostrom of Oxford has taken VR speculations to the next level, with his simulation argument. Nick has published multiple papers on the topic, and hosts a FAQ page on the subject at his site. Check it out.
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I read and I hid my face in my hands. That a person can make such and argument and not be laughed out of court as the tripe it is is a sad testament to the decline of Oxford.
ReplyDeleteBut it puts me in mind of my undergraduate days. A chap called 'Bottle' was a colleague of mine on the Debating Society Committee. He was so-called because on his first day in halls, he suggested that we might all be brains in bottles.
The trouble with simulation theories is that it would be impossible to know. If taken seriously they would drive a man mad. Without outsiders, as in the Matrix, coming into the simulation and transcending its rules, we could never know we were in a simulation.
In summary, therefore, the whole is a waste of time and I hope the Government wasn't paying for it.
You ought to check out this article on Reformed epistemology vs classical foundationalism. It highlights the philosophical problems with "properly basic" beliefs which attempt to substantiate the objectivity of external reality.
ReplyDeleteReformed epistemologists have criticised classical foundationalism as holding too narrow a view concerning which beliefs can be properly basic. Beliefs can be cited, such as belief in the existence of the past, or of the external world, that are clearly justified but cannot be either inferentially or non-inferentially justified on classical foundationalism. The existence of the past and the external world, are neither incorrigible nor self-evident, and cannot be inferred from beliefs that are incorrigible or self-evident. On classical foundationalism, then, belief in them cannot be justified.
Reformed epistemologists call for a more liberal view of proper basicality, and assert that belief in God can be properly basic. They therefore insist that it is improper to assume that belief in God is irrational unless evidence for God’s existence can be presented.
Remember how your friends at the Triablogue want me to question the "value of values"? These guys try to reduce "properly basic" to "irreducible and incoherent", in an infinite regress.
The problem is, as I pointed out at the Triablogue, they leave themselves in such an uber-skeptical position that they are rather unable to respond to "brain in a vat" arguments.