Dialog with Andy

Two of the guys in athletics department at my school are very thoughtful theists who I enjoy bantering with about theological issues. I've posted my recent dialog with Andy below, his responses are indented further and mine are between carets (>>, <<). The hyperlinks have been added to this to refer to things I've already written on the topics:

Andy wrote:

God is recorded in the sacred writ as being omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent. I've been pondering lately the implications of the third quality, given what we've learned about relativity.

>>I actually don't know if I agree with this premise or not. I think that early Christian thought didn't have this concept, but that later Christian thinkers, re-discovering philosophy from the Greeks and Romans, adopted it. For the sake of argument, let's say you're right. What I would bring up, though, are certain aspects of the OT, in particular, where God asks questions and other things in the Bible that don't comport well in a literal reading with these properties.<<

Someone ostensibly traveling at the speed of light need not age. (Is this correct?) The closer one travels to the speed of light, the slower time "moves." (I guess in actuality, there may somehow be a continuum and time moves more slowly as speeds are gradually increased, so that even at 60 miles an hour, you might age a fraction slower than someone standing still?) But this is not central to my thoughts.

>>You are right, but an important distinction: Remember that in physics, you must always clarify your frame of reference. More time passes for an observer to your frame of reference than for you within the frame of reference. It isn't that there is such a universal thing as "time" -- in the same way that there isn't such a universal thing as "space" -- space-time is experienced locally for each person, thus the need for different frames of reference. In other words, if God has on a watch, and goes near the speed of light from X to Y and back to X, the amount of time that has passed for God will be very very little compared to what we experienced in watching the space ship leave and return (observers).

But...yes, this is the basis for the Lorentz factor.<<

I cannot be in two places (let's call them points X and Y in three dimensions) "at the same time." However, as my speed increases, I can move from point X to point Y, closer and closer to "the same time" Time becomes a sort of fourth dimension, so that as I move faster, the interrelatedness and interdependence of time and space become apparent. Indeed, exceeding the speed of light even allows me to move backward on the timeline?

>>Indeed, the four-dimensional nature of space-time makes it such that if you sort of have to pick three to move through rapidly, so that you are not moving through the fourth rapidly. A really good overview of both special and general relativity is given in both of Brian Greene's layman-oriented books: The Elegant Universe and Fabric of the Cosmos.<<

The Christian theistic concept of a God that exists outside of physical time (Ravi Zacharias maintains that the Judeo-Christian God is the only God of the major world religions that attempts to speak of a God existing outside of time) then allows for a quite elementary explanation of an omnipresent God, in the sense that God is able to be in multiple places at the same time. I don't know whether it's better to explain it as God moving at an extremely fast speed, so that time slows or even reverses, allowing God to move back and forth on the space-time continuum, or whether you simply view God as existing outside of the fourth dimension of time, able to move through space without the constraints of time. In either case, this would make issues like prophecy, omnipresence, etc, all much more palatable to our limited human reason. God can simultaneously be at points X and Y, given his ability to "move quckly" and be free from the constraints of time. And so on for points, Z, W, V, etc. :) Any thoughts?

>>There is an a priori issue that must be addressed about the idea of omnipresence: what does it mean to say that God "is" somewhere? Is God even composed of a substance? If so, then we could speak of how His matter is located within space-time at those coordinates (think: Columbia, SC are the 3 space dimensions and Sun, 8/24/08 @ 1 PM is the 1 time dimension), but then we start to wonder -- is God's matter/substance interspersed between physical matter/substances? Is it like God exists between the atoms in my body (and everywhere else), and if so, then can we say that God exists "within" space-time? Can we say that God is actually omnipresent, since to be between two things is not to be at those actual things?

I think that a lot of the properties ascribed to God don't withstand serious logical scrutiny. If God "is" somewhere, does that mean being a part of that space/matter, or distinct from it? If God is "at" distinct coordinates within space-time, then is God is just as much a part of the universe as you and I? Then does that make God just as bound to the laws of physics as we are? And if so, how could God create that which God is a part of?

I don't think that special (or general) relativity really serves to provide a basis for omnipresence, because omnipresence itself is antithetical to the concepts of physics.

There is also a fundamental physical issue that makes it problematic to say that relativity "allows for a quite elementary explanation" of omnipresence. One of the things relativity does is prevent anything with mass from actually moving at the speed of light, and definitely not faster than it. [note: a differentiation must be made between c (3.0 x 10^8 m/s) and the speed of light outside of a vacuum (c/n), thus things like the faster-than-light Cherenkov radiation observed in nuclear cores]. This is a first principle issue that would diminish the ability to use the physics to justify omnipresence. Nothing is actually allowed to travel at light speed with mass, and it must travel in only one distinct direction at a time. This would also prevent traveling backwards through time as nothing could travel faster-than-light.

If God is massless, then in that sense God is not composed of anything. If God is not composed of anything, then God isn't "located" anywhere. And that gets back to the a priori issue of whether omnipresence even makes sense. You can't say, "God is at coordinates: A, B, C, D within space-time," because there isn't any "stuff" (matter/substance) which actually occupies space or time there.

In addition, as I said above, special relativity allows for objects moving rapidly in three dimensions to move very slowly in the fourth. This would put a lot of limits on your idea of being "able to be in multiple places at the same time" -- for although God could (theoretically) travel from X to Y with no apparent time loss to the observer (us), this framework still puts God thoroughly "inside" space-time. God's frame of reference is still very much bound by space-time in the sense that time still passes for God. So God is still bound to physics, rather than, as most theists believe, able to create physics.

So, to me, to try to use physics to justify or explain omnipresence is both unnecessary and illogical. You can't use a physical theory to try to explain an immaterial God. You can still believe in God, of course, but you can't support the property of omnipresence using physics.<<

On an unrelated note, what do you think about having some sort of "faith forum" in the chapel from time to time, where different faculty or staff are free to speak on topics of deeper significance, eventually even allowing some debates, Q & A, apologetic lectures, etc. I think it would be neat to all come under one figurative big tent in the collective pursuit of truth.

>>I think that sort of thing would be great. I just don't know if I personally would want to participate as a religious skeptic, since it could really be a bad thing for me career-wise. A lot of parents would just never forgive me or like me again if they heard me present arguments against the existence of a theistic God, and you might be surprised at the ways that some people would bring that up later on as ammo against me. But I would go, I would enjoy it, and I would push my students to attend. I just don't know if I personally would want to be up there at the podium/lectern. Maybe in a few years...

-------- Original Message --------

	Subject:	Re: chat yesterday
	Date:	Thu, 17 Jul 2008 04:43:46 -0700 (PDT)
	From:	Andy

Ultimately, for better or worse, I chose to focus on one or two key points. I’ve found in discussions like this it’s quite easy to try to advance on a dozen different concurrent fronts, leaving both sides unable to address any of the issues fully. Perhaps we just take a bite-size piece at a time in our pursuit of the truth. And I’ll try to provide a more timely response next time, should you respond.

>>I understand and agree.<<

First, by way of introduction, let me say that I understand why it would appear to you that Christ’s claim to BE truth is a conflation of terminology. You must admit this would follow naturally for someone who denies any metaphysical personality*. J But assume for the sake of argument that that a metaphysical personality exists (for you must grant that a finite being cannot posit with any certainty the non-existence of an infinite one). If you can picture even for a moment that this possibility exists, it becomes easier to follow Christ’s seemingly incongruous statements.

>>It seems here, and below with your asterisk-marked footnote, you may be admitting that there are things that are not philosophically "neutral" to discuss. If that is so, then you may be literally wasting your time in this dialog. I don't think that it is so. I think that most of what we'll disagree on can be examined objectively without the need for presupposing a certain viewpoint. I hope so, or else we're just arguing post hoc to legitimize (to ourselves, mostly) what we already want to believe is true, because we can't be persuaded by rational argument.

I don't think it's possible to ascribe personhood to a logical relationship. Logical relations and things like properties are the "basement" or foundation in metaphysics -- part of what philosophers refer to as universals, and there are some different ways that they describe them: nominalism, conceptualism and realism. Without getting off on a tangent, truth is a relation, or a correspondence between particulars. It is also universal because it is the relation or correspondence between an infinite number of particulars.

Personhood implies a mind (intentionality), and a mind implies more than one simple relation or property. Therefore, a mind occurs much higher up on the scale of metaphysics. Mind is not a universal. This is true whether or not I believe in God or an immaterial spirit. Minds are more than just one logical relation or property, but cannot be an infinite number of them. It's a non sequitur to say that relations between things are equal to the things themselves: walking is not just two legs, but the relationship between how they move in space-time; thinking is not just a brain, but how it functions in space-time. Another example: if Jesus is truth, and if it is true that evil exists, then Jesus is the evil that exists. I think we'd both agree that there is an error in the logic here.<<

In the same way, when he claims in the same unbelievable statement to be THE truth, is he saying that he is the representation of every physical truth? Of course not. But is he the only truth that matters in an ultimate, metaphysical sense?

>>But determining that which is true depends on knowing how logic works. Logically, Jesus can be "the way to avoid damnation" or "the only way to heaven" or something like that. Jesus cannot be "truth, period"...which is what people sometimes say or imply by referring to Jesus as truth. I think we probably agree on that.<<

I’ve found it a fascinating reinforcement of this concept that in many cases, people who reject Christ’s claims often begin to part ways with Christ as the source of Truth when a clear prohibition of scripture does not square with their lifestyle. They are unwilling to adhere to God’s moral law, and seeking to create their own moral code, they exchange the metaphysical “truth” of scripture for their own metaphysical “truth,” typically establishing moral boundaries that fit their lifestyle. Isn’t it interesting that modern attempts to invent a new morality seldom forge any rules that would de-legitimize the new moralist’s own behavior? The moral code they create always seems conveniently to square with their current behavior.

>>As I think you know, I'm not a moral relativist. Thus, a lot of what you said above doesn't apply to me. However, I can say that my lifestyle today versus my lifestyle at the time I was in church are pretty much identical. That is, I haven't taken up anything since leaving the church that was prohibited, and thus there was no incentive for decadence for me.

I'm not sure if you are in this boat, but lots of people don't believe that atheists exist. It's an interesting thing for me to hear that, as I wonder how these same people would react to me if I claimed that religion was just opiate for the masses, or said, "No one really believes in God. Deep down they know it's an invented device to help us live with the belief that there's cosmic significance to our existence, and it helps us cope with death and hardships. But they establish this to fit their lifestyle, their desire to believe that we're all more important than we really are..." It's a little insulting, isn't it? And presumptuous. Now, am I saying that you may not be correct about *some* people? No. But I'm sure the above parallel argument (that no one really believes in God) also applies about *some* people as well. I'll agree with you that sometimes it is the case that person X actually believes in the Bible and the interpretations of it given by Evangelicals, but really wants to "fornicate" and engage in "lasciviousness" (I love the KJV), and so might try to stop believing in the suddenly-inconvenient moral standard that it is against God's commandments.

However, it doesn't explain, at all, any transition in metaphysical beliefs from conservative/Evangelical Christian all the way to atheist. It may explain why certain people would relax their moral standards in order to assuage their own guilt. But, all one would need to do is transition from conservative/Evangelical Christian to a liberal Christian (e.g., Unitarian Universalist) or Deist or any of the other hundreds of options in between. There's no need to change one's metaphysical views in order to change one's moral views.

Also, consider this: does it really serve a purpose to invent/create something you don't *actually believe* is true? This implies that people reject what is true in order to do what they want, and yet if they really don't *believe* that what they reject was wrong, then they're self-delusional, and one would think, probably won't be able to live with a mind divided between what one wants to be true versus what one really thinks is true. How does it gain any relief to the sinner who pretends not to believe in his sin, but deep down still feels the guilt and shame?

The last part of your sentence could be (and probably was) used to explain why the church no longer puts people in stocks, no longer prohibits movies, music, technology, etc., etc., etc. That is, one could always say that freedom/liberty of conscience is really a "crutch" or a symptom/sign of the loss of spiritual goodness. Lots of people still refuse to allow women to wear pants or makeup, etc., etc., and they might look at you and say, "Isn't it interesting, Andy, that your 'new morality' is supposed to be grounded in God's grace and liberty, but it always legitimizes those things you already *want* to do?!?!?" The same logic works there. I think the premise is what's flawed.<<

Interestingly, while your moral realism proposes that there is a transcendent moral standard out there, in the same way that you would accuse those who follow a certain religion of “creating” their own codes through their own creativity, I believe that it’s impossible for you to prove that the moral realist is not doing ultimately the same thing—as every moral realist out there may not agree on morality, and must fabricate his own moral code. I think more problematic, though, is the issue of consequences. What consequences does Hitler suffer for his actions?

>>By your own beliefs, if *anyone* repents and asks God for forgiveness, they will suffer no consequences in the afterlife for their actions, yes? And thus the dilemma of many theistic beliefs is exposed -- you can't have both mercy and justice. You can have mercy for some and justice for others. To say that by Jesus' death, justice is served, is to pervert what justice means: Jesus was said to be morally perfect and thus innocent. Letting someone innocent "take the fall" for someone guilty is not just. It's merciful on the part of the one who volunteered to take the fall. <<

Perhaps we can relegate this to our next debate.

>>Probably a good idea. This can get convoluted in a hurry.<<

To say something “ought” to be a certain way becomes a meaningless distinction, simply a set of neurons firing in your brain at the present time, if there are no consequences. It immediately begs the questions, “Who says so?” and more importantly, “So what?” To put a moral standard out there that no one need follow might avoid the unpleasant thought of ultimate consequences in the afterlife, but it would seem there is little value in following this moral law, and little danger in breaking it. I would be eager to hear your thoughts on this, though, since I haven’t studied it except for a cursory reading online…

>>In responding to that, I would point out that there are no consequences for not believing that 2+2=4. Morality, to me, is the same way. You don't have to have consequences in an afterlife in order to make something true.

Causing harm is immoral. You (all of us) ought not cause harm.

That's just the simple truth of the matter. Trying to get into why, and how, and whether or not someone believes it or accepts it are all different issues. I would say, briefly, that just as singular objects have a metaphysical property about them that we call "1", so moral actions have a metaphysical property that we call "good" or "evil". The labels themselves may be arbitrary (imagine for a moment switching around the labels, or the numbers), but the underlying properties are not. And the underlying properties (causing harm, or alleviating suffering) exist independently of our human mind and desire.

In the same way that 2+2=4, morality is all about causing harm and recognizing the symmetry principle: you have to apply the standard of actions to others that you want applied to yourself.<<

Looking forward to more good discussions on Truth, Andy

Me too! Now it's your turn. Tag, you're it!

I'll post the responses later on. Since it took us a few months to get this dialog fully going, it'll probably be a while.

Morality and atheism: an analysis -- 3 of 3

See here for the outline of all three posts on morality and atheism.

Let's look again at the exchange with my friend via email:

BUT WHAT DOES WRONG MEAN? WHAT DOES RIGHT MEAN? WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOMETHING BEING RIGHT OR WRONG? AND WHY DOES THAT OR OUGHT THAT COMPELL TO ACT THIS OR THAT? FROM A THEISTIC PERSPECTIVE, IT MAKES SENSE. THERE IS A GOD WHO HAS THIS CHARACTER OF GOOD. WE ARE HIS CREATION AND OBJECT OF HIS CARE, AND OWE HIM LOYALTY AS HIM ON WHOM WE ARE UTTERLY DEPENDENT. HE IS ALSO THE JUDGE "WITH WHOM WE HAVE TO DO." THERE IS REASON TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS WILL. THERE IS REASON TO DO GOOD. IT ENTAILS THE DESIRE TO FULFILL OUR DESTINY AS THOSE MADE IN HIS IMAGE (TO BE GOOD), TO WALK IN INTIMACY WITH HIM, AND THE FEAR OF JUDGMENT FROM THE JUDGE

I think it should be clear that everything I've written in parts 1 and 2 was intended to deal with the question of whether or not, "from a theistic perspective, it [morality] makes sense." I attempted to argue that morality cannot be contingent upon God's nature, that God's nature is an unsatisfactory basis for moral justification, and that using God in talking about morality obfuscates, rather than enlightens. I further developed in part two on how using God in talking about morality brings up more questions than answers, given the inability for God to fit the criteria of moral virtue that our own (human) nature does.

In sitting here writing about morality, and in your sitting there reading about it, we both presuppose something important: that morality and moral motivation are amenable to reason. If, at a basic level, people will act how they feel like acting, despite rational arguments against this behavior, then both of us are wasting our time, in a cosmic sense. It is only in the hope that people can be swayed by argument and can respond to normative values that we spend time on this endeavor.

Two irreducible and irreplaceable components of morality are the fact-value and is-ought distinctions. If you cannot commit to the existence of ought or the existence of value (even if these are merely nominal or conceptual), then no moral argument can be made to move you, for all such arguments presuppose these two things. My approach in making a moral argument will be to talk about human nature, human desires, moral values and the principles of symmetry and justice. One of the things I need to assume for the sake of trying to persuade you rationally to act morally is that you have a value for your own life and/or that of others around you. If you (irrationally) conclude that your own life has no value and neither does anyone else's, then your feeling on this matter has precluded my ability to persuade you to rationally act on the values that I must assert exist.

It is here that theists often conflate atheism with a lack of value and/or lack of obligation. And they are correct in saying that if there is no value to anything, then moral realism is false and we are all really responding only to our genetic and evolutionary programming by acting on our desires and avoiding things that repulse us. If this latter scenario is correct, then we are wasting our time writing and reading about morality, and all we can hope for is that the instincts we have will serve us and our society well in the future. In fact, our "hope" in this case is just a "feeling" as well and does not necessarily conform to rational direction.

Now I want to address his question:

• Why does that, or ought that, compel us to act?

This is where meta-ethics is done and moral psychology comes in.

Now, some theists assert, belief in God is a necessary part of moral motivation. Let's put one thing out there first: even if this is true, we cannot will ourselves to believe in something that we are not genuinely persuaded to be true. That means, in effect, that unless the theist can give the atheist a genuinely reasonable argument that persuades the atheist to become a theist, then this assertion is not normative. And so, if belief in god is not possible for a given person, and if moral motivation is dependent upon god-belief, then obviously that person will lack moral motivation. It doesn't mean that they can motivate themselves to believe in something they find unreasonable in order to motivate themselves morally!

Second, the theist appeals to two things for moral motivation that may seem uniquely available to theists:

1. fear: if you don't obey God's commandments, you'll be punished for it
2. self-interest: if you do obey God's commandments, you'll be rewarded for it
   

Simply put, the components of fear and self-interest exist in the atheist's world just as much (if not more so) than a theist's. If this life is all that there is, then it takes on an extraordinary amount of value, given that it is all that we have. Morality is logically necessary for society to function, rather than fall apart into chaos. Therefore, one can be motivated as an atheist by fear of anarchy and chaos, as well as the self-interest of hoping for a stable, prosperous society to live in. In this way, atheists can use fear and self-interest just as much as a theist. I can make other arguments of a similar fashion, whether the fear is based on going to prison, or the self-interest is based on "let live in order to live" symmetry. Bentham argued along these same lines, in showing how self-interest was not contradicted by altruism, for the overall good of society.

When we use the word "good" we imply value. If one is an amoralist, and claims there is no real ultimate value to anything, then it would be rather difficult to convince said person to be motivated to act morally. By reframing the motivation into one of a reasoned argument, you are still forced to accept, at some point in time, that doing something good is of value to you or to those you care about. Here's a short simple example:

1. All of the following are good: wealth, health and happiness.
   
2. Human beings can cooperate in societies, or they can compete tribally
3. When human beings form societies, morality is necessary for order and stability
4. The lack of society, in the form of tribal competition, does not bring about the greatest amount of these goods (from 1) for the greatest number
5. Since the greatest good for the greatest number occurs within society, morality is necessary to bring about the greatest good for the greatest number
   

What this argument does is give context to "doing good" by showing that "doing good" brings about second-order goods, in the form of wealth, health and happiness. If someone denies the first premise, then of course we're back at square one. But denial of premise (1) would seem to pose a problem for a theist, as it seems that most religions accept that God wants good things for humans; what about belief in God could make (1) false?

In addition, it may simply be the case that morality is self-contained when it comes to motivation: you do what is good because it is the good thing to do; you shun what is evil because it is evil! This may be simple, but that doesn't disqualify it at all. In point of fact, this may be the best motivation of all: the nature of morality itself is normative and therefore motivates us. It does not require external factors or belief: when you know what is good, you do it; when you know what is evil, you avoid it.

• On meta-ethics

I intend to deal with exactly what the first two questions he asked mean:

1. What does wrong mean? What does right mean?
2. What is the significance of something being right or wrong?

One question that meta-ethics brings up is what our ontological commitments are. That is to say, what sorts of things exist, and what properties do they have? We do not have to (yet) "account" for the things we think exist in simply describing ontology, as this is the purview of metaphysics and requires a comprehensive analysis. The question that is relevant here is that of moral realism and how it may affect the existence or nonexistence of moral facts and moral properties.

The queerness of moral properties has been known for a long time, but is probably best summarized by John L. Mackie in 1977. The roundness of an object is given in the object's dimensions and relations to itself. This is an easy property for us to define and make sense of. What about the property of clumsiness? We all must admit it exists, but to define it, and to show how this property is instantiated and exemplified gets very complex. What may seem awkward and clumsy to one person may seem a least satisfactory to another. In addition, while the property of roundness is given in an object's relations to its own dimensions (its shape), what exactly about someone or something makes it clumsy? Its movements, yes? But exactly which movements? Therein lies the rub...

Let's consider the case of evil I've been using since the first post: drowning an otherwise-healthy infant. Is it my pushing an infant below the surface of water that is immoral? Obviously not, mothers bathe their children in the same way every day. Is it the moment at which the baby's heart and brain are clinically dead? Well, that seems to imply that if I was able to resuscitate the child to life, then I've done nothing immoral. So in the same way that it becomes difficult to pin down the exact dimension of movement that is clumsy, so it is difficult to pin down the exact dimension of action versus intent that is evil. This is part of the issue of the queerness of moral properties: how to locate and define them in the first place.

One of the things that I think causes theists to argue that God is necessary for, or at least comports well with, moral realism is that they recognize that God is attributed the same queer properties as morality is: transcendence and metaphysical ultimacy. That is to say, there seems to be nothing about space-time and physics that make moral properties what they are, and they don't seem to be contingent upon the world in which we live.

• If moral properties exist, and are metaphysically ultimate

If it is indeed true that moral properties exist in the same way the redness and roundness do, and are metaphysically ultimate (not contingent), like mathematical truths, then the answers to our questions about right and wrong are simple, although they may not be to our liking: 2 + 2 = 4 because by definition, that's just what it means to sum identities. In the same way, drowning an infant is wrong by definition, that's just what it means to be immoral. There is nothing "arbitrary" about this, it is the definition of what it is.

But wait, you say, that's not satisfactory! Perhaps it doesn't explain things to your liking, but if it's true, then it's true: morality may simply be about the issue of causing harm to others. That maybe all that it is, whether we like it or not. The problem we have with this is that even when we agree on the moral status of some act (like drowning a baby), we may come up with different justifications for why we feel it is so.

But is this problem unique for morality? Not at all. Think, for instance of defining something scientific, like the unit of length. We all use different systems of measurement, but the objects being measured, and their property of length -- assuming it is constant -- these things are not subjective, but objective. Are our own systems of measurement arbitrary? Absolutely! But, the object that we measure is not arbitrary!

Perhaps all we're doing with the different schools of thought on morality is measuring the fundamental harm that something causes, or looking at it from different angles, but we aren't changing the fact that morality is still all about harm!

Moving on to his second question: what is the significance of it? A simple answer exists: right and wrong possess their own virtuous force! The significance of something being good is its goodness, which motivates us and defines its value. The significance of something being evil is its badness, which also motivates us (away from it) and defines its (negative) value. If more significance is needed, such as fear or self-interest, then I've already covered that, above.

This is one answer to my friend's question, although we may not like it because it is "too simple".

• If moral properties exist, and are contingent

Another possible answer to my friend's question about what right and wrong "are" could be that they are related to some objective facts about the world which are not metaphysically ultimate (like mathematical truths and analytical truths). Morality could be based on human nature and evolution. Indeed, it seems to be the case that humans can all agree on a few things (if you disagree, feel free to point out which premises you find faulty):

1. Certain facts about human nature give us certain desires and needs.
2. We rank or order these desires and needs into a sort of hierarchy. The need for food and water are foundational to our own minute-by-minute survival, while the desire to procreate is contingent on these first-order needs being met.
3. We either: 1) assign value to these things, or 2) recognize that there is intrinsic value to them. This distinction is drawn for someone who may be inclined towards nominalism (1) versus realism (2) when it comes to properties and relations.
   
4. When actions and behaviors promote our values, these are "good" and thus are morally what we ought to do. When actions and behaviors detract from, or go against these values, they are "evil" and thus are morally what we ought not do. This seems to follow definitionally from the concept of something having positive or negative value to us.

Imagine for a moment that pulling off someone's arm caused them to experience an orgasm, and they immediately regrew the limb. For that person, would pulling off their arm be an immoral act? It seems clear that the facts and restrictions about human nature; namely, how we experience pain and pleasure, directly influence our concept of morality. All you have to accept is that pain and pleasure form the basis of moral value, given human nature and the desire and need to avoid pain and the desire and need to enjoy pleasure. Thus the basis for many ethical theories involving utilitarianism.

Besides this simple but easily-followed layout of how we get the idea of objective moral properties that are contingent upon human nature, we can talk about how our moral faculties evolved and what role biology plays in the exercise of morality. Please notice that we're going from what good and evil are to how we recognize them.

On a recent Point of Inquiry, Marc D. Hauser spoke of how our moral faculties may be like our grammatical faculties -- cognitive modules that either develop properly or don't, but are entirely based on biology and evolutionary logic. He and Peter Singer summarize this view in a nice article hosted by the CFI. His co-author (Singer) has also written some great pieces on this same issue -- the evolution of a moral sense -- for NYT Magazine, among others. (also see this, this and this)

Now, what these scientific explanations really do is give plausible mechanisms to explain the evolution of a moral sense in humanity, including such evolutionary oddities as kin altruism. This, in turn, explains why we have an innate disgust at the idea of child rape and a universal set of moral principles involving avoidance of suffering and harm. What this does not do is give a meta-ethical justification as to whether or not causing harm without justification (i.e., self-defense, warfare) is actually wrong.

For that, we return to the question of whether foundational concepts form the basis of morality:
"Causing harm without necessity is wrong," or something of the like. The best answer seems to be that morality is all about causing harm, and that, by definition, humans ought not cause harm without justification (self-defense or the law).

In conclusion, the answers I present to my friend's questions are:

1. Wrong and right refer to actions or behaviors that we ought not do, or ought to do, respectively. Either these things are metaphysically ultimate, such as 2 + 2 = 4, and therefore not contingent, or they are objective facts founded on human nature, based on the concepts of pain and suffering. If they are contingent, then, they are contingent upon human nature; the existence of these values flows from our own human natures: value is directly related to human needs and desires. These are universal and absolute, given that survival and death are universal human experiences, but may or may not be metaphysically ultimate. Either way, they are independent of the question of God's existence.
2. The significance of rightness or wrongness is, as Kant would say, "the thing in itself": the value of acting morally is its own significance. If this sounds circular it is meant to be so, because the entire idea of morality is self-contained: as we have seen, appealing to authority or fear are not the same as appealing to one's sense of duty and obligation. Doing good is, itself, good (valuable/significant) and doing evil is, itself, evil (it works in opposition to that which we value and find significant). One must derive value from "doing what is good/doing what one ought to do," nor find reason to oppose "doing what is evil/doing what one ought not do"

And so it seems the crux of the issue is this:

• If moral realism is true, then there are moral facts and objective moral properties.
• If moral realism is not true, then "moral facts" may simply mean that certain statements or beliefs about morality are just how humans feel about them -- this is the essence of cultural relativism
  
• If moral realism is not true, then we have no real cause to argue about morality, since you are simply affirming how you believe when you say, "X is good," or "Y is evil," and so am I. Our beliefs cannot be fundamentally proven right or wrong, and so moral disagreement may never be resolved.
  

See here for the outline of all three posts on morality and atheism.

Morality and atheism: an analysis -- 2 of 3

See here for the outline of all three posts on morality and atheism.

Something that I said in part one deserves to be revisited and expanded upon:

If theists contend that moral statements, such as, "Drowning an otherwise-healthy infant is wrong," are true in all possible worlds, then they accord to morality the metaphysical ultimacy which will undercut their argument that it can be contingent upon God's nature. If they do not accord such status to morality, then things get a little more complicated. Therefore, it is important to nail down the terms of the debate before we even begin. This is slippery, because some theists will try to "get away with" something here: if we agree that it is wrong in all possible worlds for humans to do X, but not God, then we have undercut the justification for using the same terms of "goodness" and "evil" in application to God as we do for ourselves. In other words, if what is good for us is not good for God, or if what is evil for us is not evil for God, then to say, "God is good," is an equivocation. Therefore, as shown in part one above, if metaphysical ultimacy is not accorded to moral standards transcending God's will or nature, then the phrase "God is good" itself is meaningless.

What does it mean, then, to say "God is good"?

• Can God "be good" in the same sense that we can be?

The standards of goodness that are often used cannot apply to God by definition, or at the least, the claim that they can is falsified by the evidence

What theists may say is that God cannot do such a thing. If God cannot, then God is not a free moral agent, and so to refer to God as morally perfect is absurd. If God just doesn't do these sorts of things, then God is an exemplar of the virtues that we both agree are, in reality, the underlying definition of what makes one's nature "good" or "evil". Working on this assumption, then the nature of God needs to be such that God can exemplify the virtues and morality that we agree define goodness and evil. This is where using God as an exemplar of goodness (not a justification or basis for it) may itself lead to logical issues.

Most people recognize that morality can be boiled down to questions about "ought" and that "ought" implies a duty or obligation. It is from this very perspective that I would argue that morality is logical and self-contained, and that invoking or involving God in a justification of obligation becomes senseless. Because God is all-powerful and all-knowing, is it possible for such a Being to be constrained by obligation or duties to its creations? If God is good, where good entails such obligations, then to what extent is God obligated to humans? If God is perfectly good, then would God not be completely and perfectly obligated to us?

Given the evidence of human suffering and evil in the world, I would say that the evidence is clearly against making it reasonable to believe that God fulfills obligations to the creation perfectly, or even to a great extent. This will take on the evidential, rather than logical (although it's still viable), form of the problem of evil if followed from here. I have already followed it, and won't reiterate. Suffice it to say that theists who claim that God is the perfect exemplar of goodness, and admit that goodness entails moral obligations and duties, face a serious difficult in reconciling that notion with the evil and suffering in the world. If a morally perfect God exists, then the obligation that is attached to moral perfection logically entails that God would remove, or reduce to the greatest extent possible, the pain and suffering of the creation.

Again, the theist may be inclined to rescind any obligation as part of God's goodness, but if God is not morally obligated to us, is the phrase "God is good" reflective of the notions of objective moral goodness? Does it mean the same thing as when we say, "Joe is a good person, or Sally is a good parent?" Objective moral standards include moral obligation to refrain from causing suffering and to alleviate it whenever possible. How can God be exempted from these obligations?

Another, separate problem is how, if morality is exemplified perfectly by God, humans are supposed to acquire knowledge of this, aside from revelation and/or Scripture. We see this exposed clearly in the debate between atheist philosopher Michael Martin and Christian presuppositionalist John Frame:

I also argued earlier that the objectivity of Christian morality suffers from two other problems. First, it has no rational way of deciding between conflicting claims of divine revelation and, second, it has no way of deciding between conflicting interpretations of allegedly Christian revelation. Frame maintains that the truth of Christian revelation is shown by historical investigation while I maintain that historical evidence for the truth of Christianity is very weak. Frame wisely hesitates to get involved in a protracted historical debate. I too have no desire to enter such a debate online. Readers of our debate on the Internet should study our respective works and decide for themselves whether historical scholarship has established the truth of the Resurrection, the Incarnation, the Virgin with any acceptable degree of probability.

I am inclined to believe in moral realism and objective moral properties, which I will elaborate on in the next post. For a moment, I want to reflect on one possible explanation of these properties which is not metaphysically ultimate for the purpose of argument:

• If morality is contingent on human nature

It may be that what we call "good" is in fact a reflection of things that human beings find of value. What we value is in turn often directly related to our own human nature, rather than that of God. For example, is it possible for God to be lacking in some way? Most theists would agree that the answer to that question is, "no." God can't be hungry. God can't be poor. God can't be sick. Interestingly, the things that we humans find valuable are those things that help us avoid hunger, pain, poverty, et cetera, and we all agree that those things lie at the heart of a lot of moral action. So what this means is that if we all agree that giving food to a hungry person is an act of moral goodness, then we all agree that there is value to it.

How can hunger, or its alleviation/amelioration, relate to God, when God cannot lack for anything and the very existence of the condition "hunger" is due to a physical universe that God supposedly created? Before God created this universe, did hunger exist? Was alleviating/ameliorating it good when there was no such thing as time or physicality? Isn't this a sort of nonsense way of looking at it? And this will be a recurring theme -- how is introducing God into the equation improving our understanding of morality? In fact, at each point that God is introduced into the question of morality, I would argue, we add layers of complication and confusion.

In point of fact, I would argue that bringing God into the discussion muddies the waters of clarity and may not make sense. Compassion and charity, for example, are universally agreed upon to be "good" and thus are called virtues. The question of how God can be charitable or compassionate is a very good one. Charitableness can only exist when we give something of ourselves to benefit another. Typically, the degree to which any action is charitable is related directly to what it costs us and what it benefits them. Since nothing costs God anything, and since God's sovereignty precludes any notion that God may "give" something over to someone else entirely, this may be a nonsensical virtue for God to have. In addition, God is responsible for and "owns" everything, so if someone ends up suffering and in need of charity, God is at least indirectly responsible for their condition. To alleviate a condition that one has caused is not a virtue, but making right a wrong -- rectitude.

Compassion exists in large part because we are capable of relating to the suffering of other sentient creatures. St. Paul talks about this in 2 Cor 1. When we see an animal howling in pain in a trap, we feel moved because our human nature overlaps with its animal nature in that we both feel pain. Since God cannot experience suffering and pain, how can God be moved with compassion?

Patience is a virtue. It exists for creatures within time, who experience time and wish to hurry along some thing or event in order to facilitate and make their lives easier or less bored. Since God is outside of and does not experience time, it is illogical to attribute patience to God.

Many, many more examples could be given to show that using God as an exemplar of moral goodness and virtue is logically flawed, due to the nature of God and its properties. The character and properties of God do not allow the same moral goodness that humans can and do possess. In that sense, using another human's life and actions as a standard of morality is more logical and useful than using God.

Some Christians would interject the doctrine of Incarnation at this point to try to argue that God can experience pain or charity, and I'll not spend much time refuting it, but I want to make a few quick points: (1) the properties of God may or may not be internally inconsistent, but even if they are not, they are certainly incompatible and logically contradict with the properties of human beings, (2) given that logical contradiction implies incoherence, it is incoherent to argue that God and human beings can coexist, (3) the doctrine of the Incarnation states that Jesus was/is both 100% God and 100% human being, (4) therefore, the doctrine of the Incarnation is false, reductio ad absurdum. If the doctrine of the Incarnation is not possibly true, then the argument that it can serve as a basis to support the contention that it makes sense to use God as an exemplar of morality is false.

For another logical argument I've written refuting the notion of justice based on an Incarnation, see here.

Conclusion: Because moral goodness carries with it moral obligations, this implies that if God is good then God is obligated to its creation. Attributes of human nature that make sense of morality are lacking from God. Therefore, talking about God as an exemplar of goodness may be illogical, and the evidence of failing to meet human needs is itself an argument that God does not meet moral obligations and standards. The doctrine of the Incarnation is logically flawed, and invoking it is revealing: it is necessary to introduce a human element in order to make sense of morality. This tells us that talking about God as a nonphysical omni-X entity places a burden on dialog, while we can all make solid progress talking about morality from a "merely" mortal perspective. God cannot thus be "good" in the same sense that we (humans) can be and are.

I will pick up with moral motivation and an atheistic ethical justification in the next analysis.

See here for the outline of all three posts on morality and atheism.

Morality and atheism: an analysis -- 1 of 3

See here for the outline of all three posts on morality and atheism.

I would argue that inserting God into the question of "what is good" actually confuses the issue, for two reasons:

1. The standards of goodness have to be objective and non-relative for us to use the phrase meaningfully, and thus not contingent on God's nature
2. Attempting to solve the Euthyphro Dilemma by invoking "God's nature" as non-arbitrary fails, and does not elucidate the meaning of "goodness"
   

Let's get into this further by looking at a recent dialog I'm engaging in with a friend.

He is a theist who is arguing that atheists have no ultimate justification, or grounds, for morality. This is a common claim, and has been replied to extensively by philosophers and scholars (myself being neither). This should not be confused with a weaker claim: that atheists cannot behave morally. Instead, the claim is that they can behave morally, but that their rationality and justification for doing so may be flawed. The idea is that atheists have an inconsistency in their moral argument by virtue of the claim that all morality is contingent upon God's nature in some way. The capitalized quotes come from an email he sent me, and I have italicized the relevant portion:

...BUT WHAT DOES WRONG MEAN? WHAT DOES RIGHT MEAN? WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOMETHING BEING RIGHT OR WRONG? AND WHY DOES THAT OR OUGHT THAT COMPELL TO ACT THIS OR THAT? FROM A THEISTIC PERSPECTIVE, IT MAKES SENSE. THERE IS A GOD WHO HAS THIS CHARACTER OF GOOD...

Morality is typically taken as a sort of system, or set of rational principles, by which we recognize or render behaviors and actions as “good” or “evil”, where good means, “things that we (humans) ought to do” and evil means, “things that we (humans) ought not do.” Will you agree? To avoid circularity, it is usually helpful to try to use context in defining good and evil. That is, can we develop concrete examples of and definitions for the terms "good" and "evil" for the purpose of argument?

The concrete example of an immoral action I will use throughout is: drowning an otherwise healthy infant is immoral. This is an arbitrary choice, as I could substitute shooting for drowning, or an eleven-year-old child for an infant, and the moral value of the statement has not changed.

Developing concrete examples of morality and immorality is something of a problem for a theist who wants to rely on nothing more than “God’s nature” as the ultimate foundation/basis/ontology of goodness. For example, in my asking the question, “Is action X good?” it may be difficult, if not impossible, for you to answer if you only want to lean upon recourse to God’s nature, because God's nature is not self-evident and is therefore an unknown quantity. Simply by defining God's nature as the good does not help me to further elaborate on just what that means! If X = going to a baseball game today, what would your answer to, "Is action X good?" be? Is it morally neutral? How would you know that? Does God like baseball? Would you say that God's nature is baseball? Of course not...

Do all moral actions reflect something that God would do? If so, then I can mount a counter-argument that the absence of moral action on God's part makes your assertions dubious: e.g., if you say that I am morally obligated to feed my baby, but God is not obligated to feed the human race (God's children), then we have a bit of a double standard. This seems to be an approach that Willam Alston takes, in that he argues that God does not have the sort of moral obligations that we humans have. If this is true, then there is a semantic non-trivial error in calling God "good" if by "good" this does not entail and connote the same things for God as it does in all other circumstances. If God's version of "good" is substantively different than any other, then a separate moral standard has been introduced which should not be equivocated with the objective moral standard we usually pick out with that word; relativity is now in play, because there is more than one moral standard being used. In other words, what's good for the goose is not good for the gander.

If one cannot reliably give objective, non-God-related examples of morality, without recourse to Scripture or divine commandments, it may be difficult to have a dialog in the first place. If I asked you to define "what is good/evil?" and the answer is "whatever God is" then I can simply ask, "and what is that?" You must be able to give me a working definition, or else the statement, "God is good," is a tautology, as viciously circular and useless as the statement, "God is that which God is," or "God is wgoweigwe," or "goodness is wegoeiwgwe" -- none of these are meaningfully veridical. In addition, there are many properties of God that have no moral bearing: power, knowledge, presence...

In part three of the Craig-Nielsen debate, we see this raise its ugly head, as Craig is posed with a fundamental question of how he knows that God is good:

Here I think he is clearly confusing the order of knowing with the order of being. In order to recognize that God is good, I may have to have some prior knowledge of what the good is in order to see that God is good. But that does not affect the fact that in the order of being, values derive their source from God’s being. He’s confused the order of knowing with the order of being. Simply because you can recognize moral values without belief in God, you cannot infer from this that therefore objective moral values can exist without God. So I would say that we have fundamental moral intuitions. In fact, the Bible says that God has planted these on the heart of every human person so that we intuitively recognize objective moral values. These values are rooted ontologically in the being and nature of God himself.

Craig admits here that humans have "fundamental moral intuitions" that give us the ability to "intuitively recognize objective moral values" -- that certainly addresses the question of how humans could "know" God's goodness. That is, we have the faculties (reason) to evaluate goodness in the first place. A follow-up question for Craig that would get to the definition would be, "Okay, Dr. Craig, since you know God's goodness, tell me exactly what it is about God (or about God's nature) that makes God good?" In fact, I might be tempted to probe Craig's response further: if objective moral values exist, then we are saying that principles and standards exist against which we could assess God's own moral nature -- but in what way could we do this, to know that God is good, besides recourse to revelation/Scripture? How else could God's nature be known, except to suppose it? Indeed, it cannot, and Craig and other theists simply suppose and define God's nature to be good without bothering to further elaborate on what this means and how it would constrain or limit God and God's moral agency or freedom.

Does Craig's response get to the heart of what it means to say that God (or God's nature) is good? Not at all, and I'll revisit this again frequently to hammer home this point. It does not bother to address the issue of how and whether goodness is (or can be) defined by the theist in such a fashion. Craig claims that objective moral values are "rooted ontologically in the being and nature of God" but as I'll show below, metaphysical ultimacy and logical contingency refute this claim.

So, I would say that the following things are true about saying, "God's nature is goodness," or a similar sentiment:

1. The phrase "God's nature" must be refined to exclude those characteristics and properties that are amoral: power, knowledge, &c.; in so doing some approximation of morality may emerge, but this clarification is integral to making any sort of philosophical progress
   
2. The term "goodness" may convey veracity only if it is given context or a non-circular and non-tautological definition; "God's nature" fails to do this
3. To say that we know God's nature depends on revelation or Scripture, both of which require significant human liability in establishing the veracity thereof; then, to say God's nature is goodness must mean we simply suppose this
   

On to supporting these premises:

• What it means to say that morality is not contingent on God's nature

Someone like myself, who may or may not believe in God, likes to try to see if we can separate morality entirely from the question of God’s existence. I think we can, and I think we must. I think we can use a rational approach based on classical foundationalism to figure out what sorts of things are “good” and “evil”, just as I will do in the next post on the subject, when I offer an atheistic ethical justification and moral motivation. Not only would I argue that we can do this without recourse to God, but I would argue that we have to. I would argue, in fact, that if goodness is not an objective standard by which God's nature/character can be judged and assessed, then the statement, "God is good," has:

1. zero meaning or value, like "God is qegfoqeif"
2. or is merely a tautology

And for the statement to be meaningful, for it to convey value, be non-relative, non-circular and non-tautological, goodness cannot be contingent upon God's nature, just as logic cannot be.

In modal logic, there is a classification known as "logically necessary" such that logical necessity can be applied to X when X must be true in any and all possible worlds. It is the heart of the issue involving the Euthyphro Dilemma: are moral standards and properties logically necessary, or are they contingent upon some other aspect of reality? The proposition: "All red carpets are red," is an a priori logical necessity -- it is true by definition and must be true in any and all possible worlds. Ditto with the idea of conclusions drawn from correct premises in a syllogistic mode of logic. The idea here is that God could not even make this proposition false.

The same would be true using false propositions that are logically necessary: "All completely round objects are completely square objects," is necessarily false. Something cannot simultaneously be fully round and fully square, and even God could not make this proposition true. God cannot change such logical principles, so they are not contingent.

On the other hand, the proposition: "There exists a red carpet," is a synthetic, or a posteriori logical possibility, whether or not the predicate is physically real -- this means that it may or may not be true in any one possible world, but it does not have to be true in all possible worlds. This is contingency. If a state of affairs, like me having a red carpet, is possible but not actual, then we would say that it doesn't obtain in this world, although it could in any possible world. The existence of the carpet is contingent, not necessary, and so God could control whether or not the proposition is true. As I have just shown, God cannot "change" logic in order to make a false statement true, nor a true statement false, because logic is not contingent upon God. Is morality any different?

What I would argue is that theists want to have their cake, and eat it too, by saying that morality depends upon God in some fashion (contingency), but they also want to have morality fixed to certain standards, and so they confine and limit the possibilities of God's character to fix the problem. This is theistic essentialism, and it's the trick up their sleeve: argue that God's nature must be good, such that possible worlds arguments do not hold because there can be no possible world without a morally perfect God. I'll challenge that in a moment, but for now, let's say it's true. What does this entail?

If theists contend that moral statements, such as, "Drowning an otherwise-healthy infant is wrong," are logically and therefore necessarily true in all possible worlds, then they accord to morality the metaphysical ultimacy which will undercut their argument that it can be contingent upon God's nature. That is to say, God cannot make drowning an otherwise-healthy infant moral by decree or will or command. Now, they qualify this further by saying that the reason for this moral truth is God's nature, but the important part is that God cannot change the moral truth: it is a logical necessity that drowning infants is a priori immoral.

Now, if theists do not accord such transcendent status to morality, then things get a little more complicated. This would be a theist who says that moral propositions must be evaluated as contingencies, where "drowning an infant is morally wrong," may or may not be true, given other facts and circumstances. Theists who assert such claims undermine the idea that truth in morality is an objective and transcendent affair, such as truth in mathematics. Therefore, it is important to nail down the terms of the debate before we even begin. Most theists would agree that God cannot change moral values, and they would argue this is because God cannot change God's own nature. This is an interesting argument, as it implies a few things about God's freedom and moral agency.

William Alston might argue at this point that God could drown an infant because God's moral perfection is different than moral values that humans apply because God cannot be morally obligated to act in a way consistent with an external standard. This is slippery, because some theists will try to "get away with" something here, but really they are still trapped: if we agree that it is wrong in all possible worlds for humans to do X, but not God, then we have undercut the justification for using the same terms of "goodness" and "evil" in application to God as we do for ourselves. In other words, if what is good for us is not good for God, or if what is evil for us is not evil for God, then to say, "God is good," is an equivocation. Thus theists who claim that there are different standards of morality undercut their claim that morality is objective and also render the phrase, "God is good," meaningless, as God's goodness may have little to nothing resembling our form of goodness. This flows logically into part (2) below, where I ask the question if it is intelligible for us to use God as a standard of goodness when it does not seem that God's nature can comport with goodness per se.

If theists do agree with my proposition about the transcendent moral wrongness of drowning an otherwise-healthy infant, then I would ask them if drowning the entire world, including children and infants, in the Noachian Flood was thus morally wrong, and they then have a bit of a dilemma if they believe this event is an actual historical event. If it is true that God's nature is the basis of goodness, but if God has committed acts which contradict moral standards of goodness, then there is an incoherence. Therefore, even theists recognize that a moral standard cannot be compromised in order to make it congruent with God's own character. Somehow, God's goodness must be salvaged because they know that the standard itself is ultimate, therefore there must be an excuse or apologetic to explain away any deviations from this standard, such that it does not appear to have been transgressed.

Now, this problem should not exist in the first place if goodness is that which God is. If goodness is that which God is, then there is no way that drowning infants is anything except good, since that is what God has done.

Really, all we've done here is pushed back the Euthyphro Dilemma by one step: while the Euthyphro Dilemma's original phrasing involves God's commands, which are assumed to be arbitrary, the use of "God's nature" in substitution is assumed not to be arbitrary. However, if indeed God's nature defines and ontologically roots goodness, is it by virtue of fact that it belongs to God, or is it by virtue of the fact that drowning infants is not in God's nature? If anything that belongs to God is automatically assigned the status of moral perfection, then it is obvious that morality is contingent upon the person to whom it refers, and is relative. This is what I will develop on in the next section. If God's nature defines and ontologically roots goodness by virtue of the fact that God's nature already corresponds to the objective standards of goodness, then the absolute, non-relative and non-tautological status of morality is preserved. The Euthyphro Dilemma is still alive and well, you see.

• Does invoking God's nature give any adequacy of explanation to "goodness"?

What would be implied if morality is contingent upon God's character simply because it is God's is that if the theist said that anything that was God's nature is defined as "the good", then if God's character qualities included the drowning of infants, the theist would have to say it is good to drown infants. Most theists would, understandably, not want to claim that God's nature includes anything we all already accept as immoral. And so what they are doing is, from the outset, limiting God's nature to mutually-agreed-upon objective moral standards of goodness.

This belies any claim that they make that God's nature supercedes morality, because there is no theist who will honestly say that if God's nature was one of meanness and jealousy and selfishness, that the moral value of these things would suddenly become positive. And thus they concede the metaphysical primacy of morality: it is not contingent upon God's nature. What they may argue instead is that it is logically necessary for God's nature to be morally perfect. Supposing this is one thing, supporting it is quite another.

After all, why could there not be an all-powerful and all-knowing being whose nature was such that it relished the suffering of its creations? Why could there not be an evil God? It is only paring down logical possibilities that the theist is capable of trying to define a morally perfect God. However, there is absolutely no substantive refutation of the existence of an evil God (it is a logical possibility), and thus it is not logically necessary for God's nature to conform to the objective standards of goodness that Craig admits humans have intuitions and knowledge of. Instead, Craig and other theists are admitting to us, up front, that the objective moral standards and values we all agree represent "goodness" are the logical necessities, and that only in supposing that God's nature conforms to these values makes God truly "good".

The reply that God is defined a priori as "all good" is not an objection or refutation to my claim, because it is not logically necessary that God's nature be thus, as there is no argument that could be presented that God's nature is somehow determined by metaphysical principles; and so to say, "God is good, and goodness is that which God is" is tautological and conflicts with the existence of objective moral standards. One way to prove this is to investigate as to what God (and therefore goodness) is: does God's nature permit, or even incite God to perform, actions such as the drowning of an infant? If yes, then theists have just asserted the moral goodness of drowning infants. If not, then they admit that God's nature is a reflection of objective moral standards. The circularity of "Goodness is that which God is" undercuts any ability to make philosophical progress or define the terms independently of one another, because the primacy of objective moral standards is undermined.

So in effect, they must admit that in all possible worlds, God's nature must be such that it is limited to the things that we all agree are standards of moral goodness. Thus the real issue is exposed: they define God's nature as good because they assign to it all of the virtues. It is not the other way around. What "God is good" really means is that "God is good because God's nature conforms to the objective standards of goodness that we all already agree exist."For example , God's nature is good because God's nature opposes the drowning of infants, and logically would not be good if it did not.

They don't really mean what they say when they claim goodness and evil are in some way dependent upon or contingent upon God's nature, because if "morality is whatever God is," then by definition, morality is contingent upon the character of God, which necessitates that God's nature conforms to objective standards of morality. There is no explanation as to why, at a metaphysical level, God's character must be that which corresponds to our sense of good: it is not logically necessary that God's nature be opposed to the drowning of infants. And in that sense, God's nature defines goodness, goodness is that which God is, yet that which God is becomes presupposed...a viciously circular logic and tautology at the same time.

By this contingency, it is possible that any attribute belonging to God defines goodness, and yet there are many logically possible attributes of God that would be immoral (such as enjoying the drowning of infants), as well as those which obviously have nothing to do with morality: God's omnipotence, omniscience, &c...

Here’s something from a debate between Drs. W. L. Craig and K. Nielsen:

"But God is all-knowing; he has perfect knowledge [whereas] we do not," which is true by definition. If there is such a God, this doesn’t give you any reason for doing it because perfect knowledge is compatible with perfect evil. "Well, it’s because God is all-good." Now I ask you Christians, "How do you know that God is all-good?" I know you believe it, you accept it, but how do you know it? Probably, the most common answer is this: "Well, you read the Scriptures, and you see the kind of exemplar that Jesus was ... and there are plenty of passages in which Jesus shows himself to be an incredible exemplar." But notice that to see that he is an exemplar already presupposes that you have a prior understanding of what is good and bad. Because you have an understanding of what is good and bad, you see Jesus to be a desirable exemplar. So you have an independent moral understanding and knowledge which doesn’t rest on your belief in God.

Suppose somebody says, "Look, God is the perfect Good by definition." Some philosophers used to call this an analytic truth--like "Puppies are young dogs." But if you didn’t know what "young" meant, you couldn’t even know what "puppy" meant. If you didn’t know what "good" meant, you couldn’t even know what "God" meant. You have to have some understanding of "good" to judge that God is the perfect Good. So again, you need a moral criterion that is your own and doesn’t come from God. It may come causally from God, but it doesn’t come in a justificatory sense, which is the relevant thing in arguing about morality. [emphasis mine]

This last part is especially useful when I hear theists say, “the Euthyphro dilemma doesn’t apply/work because goodness is not contingent upon God’s commands, and thus arbitrary, nor is it an objective standard by which God judges actions, and thus supersedes God entirely, but instead goodness is God’s nature.” What does this mean? What does it explain? Furthermore, is God's nature not simply the collective assembly of God's will and commands and actions? And in that sense, is it not just as arbitrary as the individual series of God's commands? If not, what determines (or determined) God's nature?

That is to say, the theist's reply that God's nature "solves" the Euthyphro Dilemma must purport to show how God's nature is non-arbitrary. Some theists, including Robert Adams, and along a different line, William Alston, have tried to do just that, but in so doing, have revealed its impossibility. Adams admits that God's nature is good in virtue of the fact that God's nature is loving towards God's creatures. Adams thus admits that the standard of "being loving towards other creatures" is the virtue that makes God good. Ergo, if someone is not loving towards other creatures, then that person is not good, which is the transcendent moral principle that is not contingent upon whom the being or Being is. It isn't that "being loving towards other creatures" could be good or bad, and simply is good because that's God's nature, versus Daniel's. So Richard Adams is impaled on the second horn of the dilemma.

Alston removes moral obligation from the definition and thus equivocates on the meaning of goodness. This impales Alston on the first horn of the dilemma -- in attempting to make sense of God's goodness, the definition of goodness itself becomes relative to the person to whom it refers. This is, admittedly, a logical escape from the implications of the Euthyphro Dilemma. But it may be an escape from the frying pan into the fire: now using the phrase, "God is good," connotes entirely different concepts from the phrase, "Daniel is good," and so while in the latter case it means, roughly, "Daniel is good, thus he does not drown infants," no such logical connotation is made by the former.

What should immediately follow from the claim "God is good" is, as Dr. Nelson pointed out, that theists are pressed to explain the claim they make: what does "God is good" mean? We all understand that the concept "young" is not contingent on puppies, and so it is non-circular to say, "puppies are young dogs" in pointing out a vital distinction in the nature of puppies v. dogs. When the theist says, "God is good," however, without recourse to an external standard against which we can evaluate God's goodness, it is a circular reference if all this means is "God is that which God is" because "Good is that which God is, and God is good." To avoid circularity or tautology, theists must make recourse to using the objective standards of morality that we all agree on, and thus define goodness in terms of these standards.

Theists claim that God's nature, as Craig said in the quote above, serves to "ontologically root" moral values, which appears to be the same as to claim that moral values exist as (part of) God's nature. But have we made any progress? Are all these things virtuous because they relate to God, or is God good exactly because these virtues are God's nature? It must be the latter, because otherwise we make morality contingent upon God's nature.

Some theists believe that God's authority or omnipotence somehow give a logical foundation to morality, but philosophers have refuted these notions long ago. Simply because someone has authority over you does not mean that they will use their authority/power in a moral fashion, and this has been shown by human rulers in history. The quantity, or degree, of authority does not have any bearing on the quality of how it is used. Simply because God has more authority does not entail that God will/must use this authority in a moral fashion. The Euthyphro Dilemma is as clear here as ever: is something good because God's authority demands it, or does God use its authority to demand those things that are good because they are good?

The exact same points can be made about any other attribute of God's nature/character, be it God's power or authority or knowledge: none of those attributes logically necessitates morality in how they are used, nor can morality be contingent upon any of them. The idea that God has a determined nature/character brings up questions. While human nature is determined by DNA and environment/development, what could God's nature be determined by? If God's nature is not determined, then God's nature could freely change, and if God's nature is the basis for morality, then morality itself is arbitrary: contingent upon a relative standard.

One way to think about how God's nature is arbitrary, but morality cannot be, is the following possible worlds thought experiment:

Suppose that there is a world in which a god named Booblefrip exists, and so do humans, almost exactly like our world. Booblefrip created all that we see and experience as humans in a physical world. Booblefrip is "all powerful" in the sense that any logical possibility (contingency) can be accomplished by his will. Booblefrip is also omniscient. The only significant difference between our world and the world of Booblefrip is that Booblefrip takes pleasure in the suffering of humans. In point of fact, Booblefrip so enjoys our suffering that It (gender neutral) introduced pathogens and parasites and genetic defects into this world in order to elevate human suffering. And, Booblefrip enjoys flooding the world so as to drown infants. The question I would have to ask a theist is this -- is morality contingent upon the nature of Booblefrip in this world, in the same way that you claim that morality is contingent upon the nature of YHWH in ours?

Those who are interested in more extensive debates of this sort, especially with respect to questions about whether "God's nature" is a sufficient reply/solution to philosophical problems like the Euthyphro Dilemma and other presuppositional apologetics, should see the Martin-Frame written dialog. as well as some other articles at infidels.org. In it, the heart of the question is laid bare: is it possible to say that morality is contingent upon some aspect of God's character?

They would argue vociferously that "taking pleasure in the suffering of others" is not a character quality that is morally good. This is a standard we agree on.

The sorts of people who make these arguments include, but are not limited to, presuppositionalists. The problem is that if they leave "God is good" as an undefended and unexplained presupposition, then they have no more philosophical economy than if I simply say, "Doing harm without cause is evil." Or if I say, "Contributing to the physical or mental well-being of others is good." If you can’t give me a reasonable explanation of God’s nature, or why it good, then you’ve no more explained why something is good than if you said, “Goodness is awvpoweigfnqwe.” (nonsense) And if I can't go further with my meta-ethical justification, then we're on equal footing, if that. Also, these presuppositionalists have to be careful in making claims like, "drowning an infant is morally evil," because they will immediately be confronted with things like the Genesis Noachian Flood, and they will have to try to reconcile the notion that when God does an action, it is morally good, while when humans do it, it is morally evil. This is clear moral relativism.

I think that most theists would jump at the opportunity to correct me if I said, "God has a nature whereby God causes harm without justification, and this is the definition of evil." What they would correct is not likely that my definition of evil (causing harm without justification) is wrong, but that this evil is not what God's nature is. So in a sense, we agree on the foundational principles, like that causing harm for fun is morally evil. And they would probably agree that the principle is metaphysically ultimate -- it would be just as wrong for God to do it as for us, and this would apply in any and all possible worlds. Therefore it cannot be contingent upon God's nature, as there are possible worlds in which God's nature obtains differently. QED

Conclusion: Saying "God is good" has little to no explanatory value. Either moral propositions are logically necessary or they are contingent. If morality is contingent, then we can come up with possible worlds in which moral standards are defined by a god's nature, but that this god's nature does not conform to the same moral standards accorded to YHWH. That is, it is completely logically possible that a god can exist with a different defined character/nature, and thus God's nature is contingent but not moral standards. If theists make morality contingent upon a god's nature, while nothing determines god's nature, then to say, "God is good," is tautological and conflicts with the existence of objective moral standards. This is incoherent, and therefore God's nature cannot "determine" morality when it is, itself, indeterminate (nothing transcends God in this view).

See here for the outline of all three posts on morality and atheism.